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As electronic commerce becomes a reality, addi-
tional services related to electronic commerce will 
also emerge. The current paper proposes the provi-
sion of electronic strongboxes as an integrated part 
of the wider electronic commerce. The strongbox 
concept is introduced as an electronic counterpart 
of physical strongboxes typically found in large tra-
ditional financial institutions, such as banks, hav-
ing secure vaults or other secure physical storage. 
The work identifies some requirements of electronic 
strongboxes both from the functionality perspective 
and from the security point of view. A simple frame-
work for' an electronic strongbox system is also pre-
sented. 
Keywords: Electronic Strongboxes, Electronic 
Commerce, Payment Systems, Distributed Systems. 
1 Introduction 
Electronic commerce on the Internet has become 
one of the major issues in computing in the last 
few years. The development of the world-wide-web 
technology and its related browsers has transformed 
the idea of commerce and trading on electronic me-
dia into a reality. The vast opportunities presented 
by electronic commerce can be easily gauged by the 
amount of serious interest shown by the business sec-
tor and by researchers in the field of computing. 
In the business sector the number of Internet Service 
IThe author is also at the tJniversity of Western Sydney-
Macarthur, NSW 2560, Australia. 
Providers have increased dramatically, responding to 
the ever greater number of people wishing to "con-
nect to the net". The term netu'ork computer has 
been coined to capture the duality of the nature of 
personal computers today, namely as a desktop com-
pu ter and as a gateway to the world of the Internet. 
From the computer research sector quite a num-
ber proposals have been put forward for the im-
mediate use of the Internet as a payment media 
through which users can carry-out transactions and 
payments linked to the existing physical financial in-
frastructure (eg. DigiCash [1, 2], ih:P [:3]. 0:etBill [4] 
and SET [5]- to name a few). Other schemes sug-
gest the use of electronic cash or coins to be used 
as a circulating currency on the Internet (eg. \et-
Cash/NetCheque [6,7]). 
As electronic commerce becomes a major actIvity 
on the Internet (and other interconnected networks). 
users will demand other related services to be deliv-
ered through and by the Internet. We perceive that 
one such service will be the provision of electronic 
strongboxes as a counterpart to the existing physical 
strongboxes, typically found in large financial insti-
tutiop..s. 
In the traditional financial sector the prOVISion of 
strongboxes has been in service for sometime. Cus-
tomers can apply to have a private strongbox held 
within a bank, in which the customer can place any 
type and any amount of valuables, subject only to 
the physical characteristics of the strongbox. The 
bank typically has no interest in the contents of the 
strongbox, and it derives income from providing safe 
st.orage and access to such strongboxes. The iden-
tity of the strongbox customer and the fact of the 
customer having a strongbox are usually treated as 
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confidential by the bank. 
In this paper we carry-over the notion of strongboxes 
from the physical reality into the digital world. We 
propose the introduction of electronic strongboxes 
on the Internet as an integrated part of the elec-
tronic commerce infrastructure. It is our belief that 
electronic strongboxes can play an important role 
for the safe keeping of important items (in their 
electronic representation). We identify some func-
tional requirements of electronic strongboxes which 
bear some resemblance to that of electronic payment 
protocols (Section 3 and Section 4). In addition, we 
present a simple framework for an electronic strong-
box system, describing some of the basic interactions 
among the participants of the system (Section 5). 
The security requirements of this system is briefly 
discussed in Section 6. In Section 7 some security 
technology considerations related to the implemen-
tation of electronic strongboxes are discussed. Some 
remarks and conclusions in Section 8 end the paper. 
2 Lockers along the Super-
Highway 
In today's banking world the proVIsIOn of strong-
boxes for customers is a common occurrence. Cus-
tomers typically place important items, such as jew-
elry and important documents, in strongboxes. Ac-
cess to the strongboxes is dependent on the bank 
that provides the strongbox service. Usually, a bank 
would require a customer to identify himself or her-
self before access is provided. Ideally, however, ac-
cess should be provided to any person when that 
person reveals a key that is recognized by the bank. 
Hence, anonymity of the carrier of the key is guar-
anteed. With the physical strongbox storage, two 
general approaches are usually provided: 
• Customer access to a private environment con-
taining all the non-removable strongboxes (ie. 
drawers). 
• Customer access only to their own removable 
strongbox, within a private environment (ie. ac-
tual boxes) 
With the current interest among the business com-
munity in conducting trade on the Internet, the no-
tion of an electronic version -of strongboxes is an 
interesting and attractive one. In the _ electronic 
world, and within the context of electronic _com-
merce, banks and other certified organizations would 
provide the electronic strongbox sen-ice to their 
tomers on the Internet. Customers may apply 
such a strongbox over the Internet. and payment 
the service can be done using electronic cash or 
electronic payment forms. The customer would t 
have access to their respective strongboxes over 
Internet, using secure browsers which allow them 
place electronic items in their strongbox. There 
almost no limit to the variety of electronic items 
can be stored in an electronic strongbox. Some 
the typical items may include: 
• Electronic coins or cash 
• Electronic bank cheques 
• Digital documents (eg. contracts I 
• Anonymous digital certificates of ownership of 
physical items 
• Cryptographic material to access other services 
A customer may have multiple strongboxes, each 
at differing institutions along the electronic "super-
highway". Access can be provide for 24-hours per 
day, and the customer would be able to move items 
among her or his own collection of strongboxes, or 
two customers can exchange items that will be stored 
in their respective strongboxes. 
Similar to the physical world, in the electronic world 
access can be delegated by a customer to another 
person by way of the customer giving the access key 
(or its suitable derivative) to that person. In such 
circumstances, the person carrying the key can ac-
cess the corresponding strongbox while remaining 
anonymous to the institution. 
A third party maybe appointed for such cases when 
disputes occur between an owner of a strongbox 
and the institution that maintains the strongbox. 
This may occur, for example, when a dishonest user 
claims that his or her access key has a matching 
strongbox within the bank, or when the bank inapro-
priately denies access to a valid owner of strongbox. 
Other institutions may act as valuers and convert-
ers of legal physical items where valuable items (eg. 
gold) are given a valuation and an electronic certifi-
cate for the item is generated. The same institution 
may also provide long-term safe storage for the phys-
ical items, whilst the anonymous owner uses the elec-
tronic certificate on the Internet. The certificate can 
then be used for personal trade or Barter, which is 
something common in everyday life. In this context, 
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can play an important role in facilitat-
those non-monetary commerce in an untraceable 
G:na3JeU"." Legal items may also be advertised anony-
as being "For Sale" over the Internet, with 
the valuers and other trusted third parties being the 
point of contact. In effect, these strongboxes can be-
come a type of secure "public storage" media, where 
individuals can disperse their electronic properties 
all over the Internet, with the storage management 
and the actual location of their physical data being 
transparent to the user. 
The concept of anonymous storage itself is not new. 
The early work by Brandt et al [8] points to the ben-
efits of anonymous and verifiable databases, partic-
ularly in the context of privacy against government 
bodies that wish to cross-correlate data belonging to 
individuals in society. In [8] the true identity of each 
individual remains unknown and the individual em-
ployed a different pseudonym (9] when dealing with 
each government body or institution. The main fea-
ture of the work was that each individual must also 
have the ability to verify that his or her personal 
details held by an institution are correct. Further 
related work has also been reported in [10]. 
However, one underlying difference between the 
anonymous/verifiable database concept and the 
public strongbox concept is the privacy of the data. 
In the anonymous/verifiable database, it is intended 
that the institution that maintains the database 
view the data belonging to the users, whilst at the 
same time maintaining the anonymity of the users. 
The users can the verify that the database contains 
correct data about the user. A typical example 
would be a hospital database containing sensitive 
medical data belonging to patients. A patient may 
have personal details that are important for medical 
requirements (eg. blood type, diabetes, etc), but at 
the same time the anonymity of the patient must be 
upheld to prevent discrimination against some pa-
tients with serious illness (eg. cancer, HIV, etc) that 
could affect their entitlements (eg. health insurance, 
medical benefits, -etc) and affect their social stand-
ing. In contrast, in the electronic strongbox concept 
the contents of the strongbox must remain private, 
with the users still remaining anonymous and being 
able to verify and modify (insert/remove) the con-
tents of his or her strongbox at anytime. 
In general, electronic items stored in a strongbox 
should be enciphered individually by its owner be-
fore they are placed in the strongbox. This ap-
proach would then allow strongbox access to be im-
plemented in two ways: -
• The owner is given the entire strongbox which 
she or he must open using the key, after which 
he or she may obtain individual items (which 
must be deciphered). 
• The owner "delegates" the institution to open 
his or her strongbox and to deliver to the 
owner specific (encrypted) items. The institu-
tion remains unable to view the specific item 
requested, as the items are enciphered by the 
owner. 
3 Functional Requirements 
There are a number of basic requirements which 
must be fulfilled by electronic strongboxes, follow-
ing the requirements of their physical counterpart. 
These are listed and briefly discussed in the follow-
mg. 
3.1 Anonymity 
Al Anonymity of ou'ner. 
The owner must always remain anonymous, and 
the fact that she or he owns a strongbox must 
also remain a private fact. },lethods to create 
pseudonyms exist in other forms of electronic 
commerce which can be used in the strongbox 
case. 
A2 Anonymity of I.:ey holder. 
The key holder is the user that presents a valid 
key to the bank to access a strongbox held by 
the bank. The bank has the right to verify that 
the key fits into one of its strongboxes, and to 
deny access if the verification fails. The key 
holder can be the owner of the strongbox or any 
other user delegated to access the strongbox by 
its owner. 
3.2 Privacy 
PI Privacy of strongbox contents. 
As in the case of physical strongboxes, the con-
tents of the strongbox should remain undis-
closed to all parties except the key holder open-
ing it using a valid key. Any system imple-
menting the strongbox should ensure that the 
institution providing the service does not have 
backdoor or other hidden channels to access or 
view the contents of the electronic strongbox. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In addition, the strongbox should be tamper-
resistant from the institution itself, who might 
attempt to illegally remove or add items to the 
strongbox. This may be achieved using cryp-
tographic techniques (eg. hashing, signing) to 
provide the owner with proof and assurance 
that the strongbox has not been tampered with 
since it was last accessed. 
In the physical world, some level of trust ex-
ists between the bank and strongbox owner, 
whereby the owner relies on the bank not to 
place hidden cameras designed to view the 
strongbox contents and that the bank will not 
tamper with the strongbox. Ideally, such trust 
should also exist between a customer and the 
strongbox provider, similar to the level of trust 
between merchant and acquirer [3, .5]. 
P2 Privacy of strongbox locations. 
A user may have multiple strongboxes scattered 
all over the Internet under different guarding 
institutions. The locations of these strongboxes 
should be private information, available only to 
the owner (or any other delegated user) and the 
respective institutions. One institution should 
not be aware that its customer also owns strong-
boxes elsewhere. 
P3 Access to strongbox only by a key holder. 
The institution must without exception provide 
access to the strongbox only to the key holder 
that presents a valid key. 
A security mechanism must be employed to pro-
vide at least two levels of verification, namely at 
the point of request for access to the strongbox, 
and later at the point of the opening strong-
boxes. These two levels can be implemented 
cryptographically, and should eliminate possi-
bilities of procedural errors. 
P4 Storage of a variety of electronic items. 
An electronic strongbox should be able to store 
a variety of digital items, subject only to the 
agreed storage space limitations. Even such 
limitations should be easily and immediately 
negotiable when a user reaches his or her stor-
age limit. 
System parameters that protect the strong-
boxes must be maintained under secure and 
tamper-free storage at the institution. 
3.3 Contents Transferability 
Cl Items exchangeable between strongboxes. 
Analogous to the physical counterpart, elec-
tronic strongboxes must allmv for the exchange 
of items between two (or more) strongboxes. 
Strongboxes may belong to the same owner, or 
they may belong to different owners who are 
working together. 
C2 Untraceability of moved items. 
Since the contents of strongboxes must remain 
private, moved items must then be untrace-· 
able. Untraceability should hold regardless of 
how many times an item has been moved be-
tween strongboxes, and regardless whether or 
not the item finds its way into a strongbox 
within which it previously resided. That is, a 
strongbox should not have a "memory" of its 
previous con ten ts. 
3.4 Delegations 
Dl Strongbox key can be delegated. 
Similar to the physical strongboxes, any person' 
carrying the appropriate key must be able . 
open the electronic strongbox. Ideally strong- . 
boxes should even allow stolen keys to be used," 
as the issue of protecting keys is separate from 
user anonymity. 
In the banking sector some banks do provided .. 
the owner with some protection against stolen 
keys. However, methods that require user' . 
tification can also result in the user's . 
being revealed. 
In electronic strongboxes, delegation should 
provided, whereby an owner of the strongb 
can delegate another user to become a 
holder in order to access the owner's st 
box. Both users must remain anonymous. 
the same time, delegation schemes must have 
limited lifetime or the ability to be revoked 
the owner [11]. 
Single-use keys may provide a solution, in 
delegated keys are derived from the original 
and where the bank holding the strongbox 
aware of a key being a derivative, and 
allow only one-off access to a given stLV""'U'~'O" 
Multiple-use keys may also be devised, 
technology similar to electronic coins. 
usage of the key would reduce its 
until it is diminished when it reaches its 
mum number of usages. 
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Additional Functional Re-
quirements 
. The flexibility of the digital world presents a num-
. • ber of opportunities to provide features of e1ec-
. tronic strongboxes which are infeasible or difficult 
to achieve in the physical world. 
4.1 Movable strongboxes 
Electronic strongboxes should be be movable be-
tween institutions, similar to the way electronic cash 
or coins are movable around the Internet. An owner 
of a strongbox must be able either to move the entire 
strongbox without opening it, or to shift the con-
tents of one strongbox at one institution to another 
strongbox under a different institution. Both alter-
natives are attractive, and both should be available 
to the user, depending on the user's circumstances. 
Security, privacy and anonymity must be ensured in 
both cases. 
4.2 Notification to the owner 
Although the owner of a strongbox must re-
main anonymous through the use of pseudonyms. 
they must be available for notifications via their 
pseudonym. Notifications may include: 
• Notification (confirmation) that the owner's 
strongbox was accessed at a particular date and 
time (or a failed attempt was made to access the 
strongbox). 
• Notification of fees that are due to be paid by 
an owner of a strongbox 
4.3 Electronic charges 
Owners of strongboxes pay their fees using electronic 
currency. This can be done on a periodic basis, 
or long-term payments can be made upon the com-
mencement of the strongbox. 
When an owner is absent from the Internet for a 
long period or when the owner fails to answer notifi-
cations concerning overdue fees, the institution may 
take the strongbox off-line and keep it on secondary 
storage (eg. dump into CD-ROM). When the owner 
in future requests access to the owner's strongbox, 
the institution can bring the strongbox on-line only 
after the due fees are paid by : ie owner. Proving 
ownership can be through the a.::::""s key in the usual 
manner. Disputes with regarl:~ :0 payments must 
be resolved through a third pa:::: acceptable to the 
owner and the institution . 
4.4 Designation of heir 
An owner of a strongbox shouk. :,e able to designate 
another valid pseudonym as a:, heir to be notified 
and given access in the case tin, the owner dies or 
the strongbox is never accessec oYer a long period 
of time (eg. years). This shou;(\ occur if no prior 
arrangement was made by the ,'wner with the insti-
tution regarding very infreque::: access, and if the 
owner fails to respond to the ':::crious notifications 
about fees that are due. Other ;'~ocedures must also 
be applied in the case that the j.esignated heir fails 
to respond. In all these cases. t :::' ,.'resence of a third 
party such as a lawyer or not 3::: \\"ould be required 
as in the usual case. 
The issue of property inherit3:::;:' in the electronic 
world remains an interesting ,'~'en problem. both 
from the legal aspect and from; ;le economic aspect 
(eg. taxation in certain countri",,) [12]. 
5 A Simple Franlework for a 
Strongbox Syst.elll 
In this section we propose a ~imple frame\\'ork for 
a strongbox system (Figure 1'. using components 
( ie. participants) typically found in electronic com-
merce systems. All electronic interactions between 
participants are assumed to be over a secure chan-
nel, with peer authentication (,'nJucted at the com-
mencement of communication~. The current pro-
posal does not pretend to be .:,'mprehensive. and it 
attempts to address the main l','mponents only. Ad-
ditional components will be required to support the 
framework to achieve full workability. 
The participants of the system are as follows: 
• Customer: the customer or user, interacting 
with the Strongbox Provider (eg. Bank) for the 
safekeeping of electronic items. 
• Strongbox Provider: an institution that provides 
the electronic strongbox sen'ice to a customer. 
• Valuer: the on-line Valuer is trusted to verify 
that an electronic item belonging to an owner 
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Customer 2 1-------------
Facilitator 
Figure 1: Electronic strongbox system 
(ie. Customer) truly exists and has not been 
modified by its current owner. The Valuer can 
also be requested to split items into several sub-
items, and issue certificates for them. Several 
Valuers may exist on-line, and each must recog-
nize the other's certification. 
• Exchange Facilitator: the Exchange Facilitator 
aids two or more Customers who wish to ex-
change items from their strongboxes. The Facil-
itator can be a Strongbox Provider and is under 
the jurisdiction of the Association. 
• Association: the Strongbox Providers and the 
Valuer work under the umbrella of the Associ-
ation. Customers bring disputes to the Associ-
ation. 
In addition, there are the Physical Valuer and the 
Notary which are in the physical world and inter-
faced to the electronic world. The Physical Valuer 
should be distinct from the on-line Valuer as the 
Physical Valuer knows what a physical item con-
stitutes and which pseudonym forwarded the phys-
ical item to be valued. The Physical Valuer stores 
the physical items at the Secure Physical Storage, 
to which the Association has access in the case of 
disputes. The Notary comes in on behalf of a Cus-
tomer when disputes necessitates their presence. In 
the remainder of this paper, uniess otherwise stated, 
the term "Valuer" will refer-to the on-line Valuer (as 
opposed to the Physical Valuer). 
The Customer is the owner of the contents of a 
strongbox and is deemed also as the owner of t 
strongbox. The Customer obtains membership 
the system through the Association which . 
the Customer with the credentials (eg. within a 
smartcard) and with a pseudonym to be used within 
the system. The Customer henceforth employs thIS 
pseudonym when using the system. The Associa--
tion may in fact be that which exists in the elec-
tronic commerce infrastructure and which oversees 
the usual electronic trading, purchases and payment. 
The Customer joins the strongbox service by open-
ing an account with the Strongbox Provider, which 
can be a Bank or other institutions having the neces-
sary computer infrastructure to provide this service. 
In order to bring an item into the system the Cus-
tomer must first obtain a valuation of the physical 
item to the Physical Valuer. The Physical Valuer 
issues the Customer with a digital certificate cor-
responding to the physical item. This certificate is 
recognized and accepted by all participants in the 
system. If requested, the Physical Valuer may at-
tach a monetary value to each item, which may then 
be described in the certificate. The actual physical 
item itself is kept in the Secure Physical Storage, 
under the control of the Physical Valuer and/or the 
Association. Any Customer presenting an electronic 
certificate for a physical item can obtain the item 
from the Physical Valuer or through the Associa-
tion. 
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_ . The unit of the physical item to be valued and certi-
. ned must be agreed upon between the Customer and 
_ -the Physical Valuer (eg. six bars of gold can be writ-
.... ten under one certificate, or six certificates can be 
produced corresponding to the ~ix physical item~). 
Having small units for the valuatIOn allows for easier 
usage of the items at a later date. However, should 
a Customer wish to break-up an electronic item into 
·several reasonable components - bearing in mind the 
physical reality of the item - the .Customer c~n ap-
proach the on-line Valuer to obtam such services. 
Here, although ideally any physical item should 
be allowed to be introduced into circulation, so-
cial/economic stability and order demands that il-
legal items (eg. drugs) be prevented from entering 
the electronic system. This prevention can be con-
ducted at the Physical Valuer interface. 
It remains an interesting and open problem as to 
whether a Customer must prove ownership of legal 
items. The extent to which electronic strongboxes 
should mimic physical strongboxes, particularly in 
the case of stolen goods, must be decided by author-
ities implementing the system. 
Once within the system the certificate is referred to 
as an electronic item. \Vhat the item constitutes and 
who holds the item presently must remain confiden-
tial. A Customer can store the electronic item with 
any Strongbox Provider, assuming he or she already 
has a strongbox account with them. 
When two or more Customers have agreed to ex-
change items, they can carry-out the exchange of 
the corresponding electronic items through the Ex-
change Facilitator. Ideally, before an exchange oc-
curs, the Customers should prove the possession of 
the items to each other (eg. via zero-knowledge pro-
. '. tocols). However, even without such pre-exchange 
confirmation of possession, the Exchange Facilitator 
must be able to ensure that no cheating occurs. The 
Facilitator must inform each Customer as to the elec-
tronic items it has received for the exchange instance 
(to prevent cheating), and the Facilitator must also 
provide a guarantee of non-repudiation should one 
, (or both) Customer dispute the exchange. The Fa-
cilitator can be a trusted third party, or it can be one 
of the Strongbox Providers selected by both Cus-
tomers. 
The use of the Exchange Facilitator is optional. Cus-
tomers can perform any exchange of items directly 
. among themselves, through a secure channel. How-
ever, without the Exchange Facilitator disputes can-
not be resolved and the burden of risks lie fully with 
the Customers. 
6 Security Requirements for 
the Strongbox System 
Similar to electronic payment systems, a number of 
security requirements exist for the strongbox sys-
tem to be reliable and workable. It goes without 
saying that the authentication of participants holds 
an important place before any interaction can oc-
cur. The impossibility of forging of electronic items 
must be guaranteed throughout the system. Finally. 
the requirement of undeniability of actions (or non-
repudiation) carried-out by participants in the'sys-
tem. Some of the other more specific requirements 
are briefly presen ted in the following. 
Strongbox Provider Requirements 
• Proof of the retrieval of a strongbol·. The 
Provider must have some form of proof that 
a strongbox is currently being "checked-out". 
That is, that the strongbox has been retrieved 
and is currently in the possession of the Cus-
tomer. This is to prevent the Customer from 
claiming otherwise and therefore forcing the 
Provider to take account of losses. This notion 
is similar to that of the forging of electronic cash 
or coins, or to that of denying that payments 
have or have not been made. 
The retrieve and store operations must exhibit 
the typical transaction properties of atomicity, 
consistency, isolation and durability [13. 14]. 
A further aspect that must be taken into con-
sideration is the allowable length of time for a 
strongbox to be held (checked-out) by its owner 
and the implications on security. Given that a 
Customer typically knows the contents of his 
or her strongbox - either from human memory 
or through a list stored securely (eg. within 
a smartcard) - it is reasonable to assume that 
the check-out and check-in should occur within 
the span of a single transaction. A reasonable 
timespan would similar to that in which a mer-
chant expects immediate payment from a pur-
chaser. 
• Verification of access key of the strongbox. Be-
fore providing a key holder with access to the 
claimed strongbox, the Provider must have suf-
ficient proof that the requester (ie. owner 
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or their delegate) is a valid party within the 
system. That is, the requester has a valid 
pseudonym and can be authenticated. The 
Provider must also verify that the key is a rec-
ognized and valid key. 
One potential problem would be the possibility 
of the illegal duplication of access information. 
That is, the potential that more than one ac-
cess key exists at any time. Current technology 
can solve this problem either through smartcard 
systems or through the provision of a single-use 
access keys for the strongboxes. In the later 
case, a new access key needs to be generated 
each time a strongbox is retrieved and stored. 
Customer Requirements 
• Unauthorized retrieval of strongbox IS Impos-
sible. A Customer must have the assurance 
that the unauthorized checking-out of his or her 
strongbox is impossible. Stolen electronic items 
should be prevented from circulating without 
being detected. 
Depending on the implementation, the certifi-
cate corresponding to the item may carry the 
pseudonym of its current owner (see the next 
Section). Since the certificate is unforgeably 
signed by the Valuer, stolen electronic items 
may be detected later at an Exchange Facilita-
tor, a Valuer or at a Physical Valuer. A possible 
safe-guard can be implemented at the physical 
end, when Customers convert their electronic 
items back into physical items currently being 
stored in the secure physical storage. 
• Proof of storage by the Prol'ider. A Customer 
requires some proof in the form of a receipt that 
his or her strongbox has been correctly checked-
in and that the Provider now holds the strong-
box. 
• Proof of valuation. When an electronic item 
undergoes valuation or when it is split by the 
Valuer into several electronic sub-items, a Cus-
tomer owning the item (and thus the sub-items) 
requires proof that the Valuer currently holds 
the item, and also proof that the valuation has 
been carried-out. Clearly the Valuer itself must 
be a certified one and be authenticated by the 
Customer before any valuation transactions oc-
cur. 
• Proof of exchange tmnsaction. When a Cus-
tomer carries-out an exchange of items with an-
other Customer via the Exchange Facilitator, 
both Customers must have sufficient proof that. 
the exchange occurred correctly in such a way' 
that neither party can deny the transaction. 
Valuer Requirements 
• Proof that valued" item and valuation result has 
been received by Customer. This is to prevent a 
Customer accusing the on-line Valuer of stealing 
an item submitted for valuation. 
Exchange Facilitator Requirements 
7 
• Proof of exchange transaction. Corresponding 
to the proofs required by a Customer for the 
exchange of an item, the Facilitator requires 
proof of the submission of the items to be ex-
changed, and more importantly proof of the 
delivery and receipt of the items after the ex-
change. This proof must come from all involved 
Customers, and serves as protection for the Fa-




There are a vast number of issues related to the con-
cept of electronic strongboxes and their implemen-
tation. It is beyond the scope of this introductory 
paper to cover each of them. Some of these, however, 
are briefly discussed in the following. 
7.1 Representation of Electronic 
Items 
There are many ways to represent items electroni-
cally. One possible method would be to employ two 
types of certificates for each item: 
• Item Certificate: this is the electronic item it-
self in the shape of an unforgeable certificate 
and having a one-to-one correspondence with 
the physical item. The Item Certificate carries 
the signature of the Physical Valuer and is co-
signed by an on-line Valuer. 
• Description Certificate: this IS a certificate 
guaranteeing that a given item exists some-
where in the system. The certificate may con-
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tain a digest or hash of the Item Certificate, 
and is signed by the on-line Valuer. The certifi-
cate may contain the pseudonym of the current 
owner. 
The two certificates are inseparable and should be 
stored together in the strongboxes. The aim of hav-
ing a Description Certificate is to allow one Cus-
tomer to prove its ownership to another Customer 
before an exchange occurs. During an exchange, 
both certificates are handed-over as an item unit. 
The concept is derived from the idea of certified pho-
tocopies of important documents (eg. passports) 
which are often required for government and legal 
purposes. Periodically the Description Certificate 
must be renewed by way of the Item Certificate be-
ing reconfirmed by the on-line Valuer. 
Similar to electronic cash, some form of serial num-
bering may be applied to all electronic items system-
wide, to prevent illegal copying of certified items by 
its current owner. This must be done with the pre-
caution that the serial numbers do not become way 
to trace the movement of items [15J. 
Upon an exchange between two Customers the Ex-
change Facilitator may request an on-line Valuer to 
re-certify electronic items as belonging to their new 
owners respectively. For each electronic item, both 
the Item Certificate and the Description Certificate 
must be signed by the on-line Valuer. The Descrip-
tion Certificate will then contain the pseudonym of 
the new owner of the corresponding item. 
Note that no identity information, such as the 
pseudonym, is mentioned anywhere within the Item 
Certificate. Thus, the current owner of the Item Cer-
tificate may at any time obtain the actual physical 
item by presenting the Item Certificate to the Phys-
ical Valuer. The Physical Valuer must then inform 
the on-line Valuer of the removal of the item (via its 
serial number) from circulation within the electronic 
world. 
7.2 Security on the User's Side 
Security - or the lack of it - is currently one of 
the main obstacles to achieving the full use of elec-
tronic commerce on the Internet. Large financial in-
stitutions such Banks have the necessary resources 
to establish a reasonable level of security for their 
computing systems. However, security on the user's 
side is lacking. The vision of millions of users on 
their workstations or Home PCs conducting elec-
tronic commerce or trade must first address the need 
of trusted computing technologies at the user's end. 
There a number of potential approaches that can be 
taken to provide security at the user's end: 
• Tamper-resistant technology. Tamper-resistant 
boxes can be provided as part of the internal 
hardware for the typical PC or Network Com-
puter (NC). Smartcards can then be used to 
load specific security parameters to such boxes. 
The challenge in the future lies in making these 
affordable. 
• Access terminals. Institutions can provide ac-
cess terminals in the manner of Automatic 
Teller }'lachines. Besides providing physical se-
curity. such terminals can be available at the 
institution's premises. Although practical. this 
approach somewhat defeats the convenience of 
conducting electronic commerce from the user's 
desktop. 
• Probe software. Although a contentious issue. 
the notion of down-Ioadable self-executing soft-
warc> is an ::lttr::lcti\'e one. Here. an institu-
tion or a trusted third party can provide auto-
executables which can be down-loaded (eg. via 
a browser) and \\"hich can perform automatic 
remote scanning or probing of a user's worksta-
tion or PCj;';'C to evaluate its security. This 
notion can be extended to situations where the 
software reboots the workstation and loads a 
specific secure operating system for the work-
station. After the session, the previous local op-
erating system can be reloaded. How this con-
cept and its implementation can be extended 
over wide networks - and how acceptable it will 
be to the user community from the privacy per-
spective - remains to be seen. 
7.3 Multilevel Secure Strongboxes 
The idea of multiple strongbox providers lends im-
mediately to the notion that strongboxes can have 
differing levels of security and therefore cost of 
maintaining them. The frequency of access also 
plays an influence on the costs of the strongboxes. 
User's \\"ith less valuable items may choose cheaper 
and "weaker" strongboxes, while for their expen-
sive items they may choose the strongest strong-
boxes froU1 the variety of strongbox Providers. 
Each strongbox Provider may offer either a uniform 
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strongbox type or provide differing levels of strong-
boxes. 
8 Remarks and Conclusion 
Having proposed electronic strongboxes as part of 
the electronic commerce infrastructure, this pa-
per has attempted to identify some the functional 
and security requirements of electronic strongboxes. 
This effort does not pretend to be comprehensive, 
as there are a number of issues that remain to 
be resolved in the wider context of electronic com-
merce, and also within the specific scope of electronic 
strongboxes. It also does not ignore the fact that dif-
ficulties exist in any design and implementation of 
the concept. vVe believe, however, that the concept 
should be tied closely to developments in electronic 
commerce and payment systems, as these areas will 
represent the infrastructure within \vhich the elec-
tronic strongbox concept can be comfortably imple-
mented. The current paper has presented a simple 
framework for an electronic strongbox system, tak-
ing the more familiar participants from electronic 
payment systems. 
The provision of electronic strongboxes as a service 
should not be too far in the future, as the security 
technology to implement it has partly arrived accom-
panying electronic commerce. There are a variety of 
issues which must be addressed to realize strong-
boxes in the wider context of electronic commerce. 
Some of these issue include, but not limited to: 
• Anonymity of Customers, while providing the 
various features of electronic strongboxes. 
• Interfacing electronic strongboxes with physi-
cal strongboxes at the Secure Physical Storage 
component. 
• Value of items versus strongbox costs. 
• Key escrowing of strongbox-keys by govern-
ments in some countries. 
• Legal status of strongboxes when the owners are 
foreign nationals. 
• Transferability of strongboxes across national 
boundaries. 
• Item exchanges over national boundaries and 
the type of Exchange F.acilitators that will thus 
be needed. 
• Effects of converting electronic items back into 
physical items when the new owners are foreign 
citizens and its legal implications. . 
• Valuer infrastructure required for an interna-
tional strongbox system. 
These issues will be the subject for continuing re-
search as they are important for the economic viabil-
ity and technical feasibility of the electronic strong-
box concept. 
A cknow ledgement s 
We thank the anonymous referees for their useful 
comments and advice. 
References 
[1] D. Chaum, "Security without identification: 
Transaction systems to make big brother ob-
solete'" CommunicatlOlls of the ACJf. vol. 2S, 
no. 10, pp. 1030-1044, 19S.}. 
[2] D. Chaum, "Achieving electronic pri\'acy," Sci-
entific American, pp. 96-101, August 1992. 
[:3] :\1. Bellare, J. A. Garay, R. Hauser. A. 
Herzberg, H. Krawczyk, M. Stei~er, G. Tsudik, 
and ~1. Waidner, "iKP - a family of secure elec-
tronic payment protocols." in Proceedings of the 
First USENIX Workshop on Eiectro/!lC Com-
merce, (New York), USENIX, 199.5. 
[4] ~I. Sirbu and J. D. Tygar, "NetBill: An in-
ternet commerce system optimized for network-
delivered services," IEEE Personal Communi-
cations, pp. 34-39, August 1995. 
[5] Visa and :\IasterCard, "Secure Electronic 
Transaction," 1995. http://www.visa.com. 
[6] B. C. ;\euman and G. Medvinsky, "Require-
ments for network payment: The NetCheque 
perspective," in Proceedings of IEEE Comp-
con'95, (San Francisco), IEEE, 1995. 
[7] G. l\Iedvinsky and B. C. Keuman, "NetCash: A 
design for practical electronic currency on the 
internet," in Proceedings of the First ACJf Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, ACi\I. November 1993. 
[S] J. Brandt, I. B. Damgard, and P. Lan-
drock, "Anonymous and verifiable registration 
Second Workshop on Electronic Commerce USENIX Association 
in databases," in Advances in Cryptology - Pro-
ceedings EUROCRYPT '88 (Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science No. 330) (C. G. Gunther, 
ed.), pp. 167-176, Springer-Verlag, 1988. 
D. Chaum, "Untraceable electronic mail, return 
addresses, and digital pseudonyms," Communi-
cations of the ACM, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 84-88, 
1981. 
T. Hardjono and J. Seberry, "Applications 
of smartcards for anonymous and verifiable 
databases," Computers fj Security, vol. 14, 
no. 5, pp. 465-472, 1995. 
M. Abadi, M. Burrows, C. Kaufman, and 
B. Lampson, "Authentication and delegation 
with smart-cards," Technical Report 67, Dig-
ital Systems Research Center, October 1990. 
R. Kalakota and A. B. Whinston, Frontiers of 
Electronic Commerce. Addison-Wesley, 1996. 
L. J. Camp, M. Sirbu, and J. D. Tygar, "Token 
and notational money in electronic commerce," 
in Proceedings of the First USENIX Work-
shop on Electronic Commerce, (New York), 
USENIX, 1995. 
4] L. Tang, "Verifiable transaction atomicity for 
electrof!ic payment protocols," in Proceedings of 
1996 IEEE ICDCS16 International Conference 
on Distributed Computing System, IEEE, May 
1996. 
D. Chaum, "Privacy protected payments: Un-
conditional payer and/or payee untraceability," 
in Smart Card 2000: The Future of IC Cards 
(D. Chaum and I. Schaiimuller-Bichl, eds.), 
pp. 69-93, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989. 
Association Second Workshop on Electronic Commerce 145 
